N-Variant Execution (NVX) systems utilize software diversity techniques for enhancing software security. The general idea is to run multiple different variants of the same program alongside each other while monitoring their run-time behavior. If the internal disparity between the running variants causes observable differences in response to malicious inputs, the monitor can detect such divergences in execution and then raise an alert and/or terminate execution.
Introduction
Memory errors have been a continuous source of software vulnerabilities for C and C ++ programs. Attackers and defenders are engaged in an arms race in which the former keep developing increasingly sophisticated defenses while their adversaries keep crafting novel exploits that bypass these defenses [60] . At present, adversaries rely on intimate knowledge of the target environment (such as details about the victim application, the target operating system, the instruction set architecture of the host, and runtime parameters such as memory addresses) to mount code-reuse [9, 56, 58] or dataoriented attacks [11, 34, 35] that allow them to take control of the target and/or leak its sensitive data. While memory safety techniques can provide strong protections against these threats, many of these techniques have not seen widespread deployment due to performance [47, 48] and compatibility problems [59] .
Instead, defenders resort to mitigation techniques that have a more reasonable performance impact, e.g., control-flow integrity (CFI) techniques [1, 7] , automated software diversity techniques [42] , or a combination thereof. Both of these classes of defenses have a history of known weaknesses. CFI techniques often leave sufficient leeway to mount attacks on all but the most trivial applications [8, 13, 15, 19, 21, 24, 25, 62] , and software diversity techniques have been bypassed using brute-forcing and information leakage attacks, including attacks enabled by micro-architectural side channels [3, 5, 13, 18, 20, 22, 26, 29, 30, 36, 38, 43, 49, 57, 58] .
N-Variant eXecution (NVX) systems amplify the effectiveness of software diversity techniques and increase resilience [4, 6, 14, 32, 33, 39-41, 45, 46, 53, 65, 67-70] . An NVX system runs multiple diversified variants of the same program in parallel on the same inputs while monitoring the variants' behavior for divergences. With the right selection of diversity techniques, NVX can make successful exploitation substantially harder (and, in some cases, even provably impossible) as it forces adversaries to simultaneously compromise multiple program variants without causing observable changes in their behavior.
Existing NVX systems have been particularly effective at stopping attacks that rely on knowledge of the target's absolute virtual address space layout (i.e., code-reuse exploits whose payloads include absolute pointer values) [6, 14, 67] , as well as attacks that attempt to acquire that knowledge (i.e., information leakage attacks) [45] . However, these systems are not resilient to Position-Independent ReturnOriented Programming (PIROP) attacks [27] and certain DataOriented Programming (DOP) attacks [35] , which build on knowledge of the program's internal geometry (e.g., relative data/instruction layouts) and/or data representation. The main 1 reason is that in previous NVX systems all the variants run on the same machine as shown in Figure 1(a) . Thus, the amount of diversity that such systems can achieve is limited to what a single platform can offer. On the other hand, binaries targeted at multiple different platforms have an inherent diversity that comes naturally from differences in calling conventions, instruction set architectures, endianness, system call interfaces and available hardware features.
In this paper, we present DMON, an NVX system that allows us to leverage the diversity that naturally exists across different platforms, thereby increasing resilience to memory exploits. DMON compiles and runs each program variant on its own dedicated machine and monitors divergent behavior between these distributed variants by cross-checking them at the system call boundary via a network. Figure 1 (b) illustrates our design. To bypass DMON, adversaries would need to develop exploits that work simultaneously against the two (or more) different ISAs and ABIs that the program variants are compiled for. DMON runs on commodity hardware with regular multi-core CPUs. As our evaluation shows, DMON's overhead can be further reduced by optionally adding specialized network interface cards with Remote Direct Memory Access (RDMA) support.
Our contributions are as follows:
• We present DMON, the first system that combines ISA and ABI heterogeneity with N-Variant Execution. DMON distributes the execution of a set of variants over a heterogeneous set of physical machines. DMON provides a natural resilience against memory exploits as it forces adversaries to develop exploits that work simultaneously against multiple ISAs, ABIs, system call interfaces, and available hardware features.
• We study and identify several performance bottlenecks and cross-checking issues that are unique to the distributed and heterogeneous monitoring setting and present strategies to alleviate these issues.
• We evaluate DMON's security on several realistic server applications and show that DMON makes successful code-reuse and data-only attacks substantially more difficult.
• We evaluate the performance of DMON on a wide set of microbenchmarks and server applications, conduct a thorough security analysis on several sets of ISA/ABI-heterogeneous program variants, and conclude that DMON offers strong protections at reasonable cost.
Background
Researchers in the information security [4, 6, 14, 40, 45, 53, 65, [67] [68] [69] [70] and software reliability communities [32, 33, 39, 41, 46, 51] have presented over a dozen different NVX systems since 2006. Although these systems serve a variety of different purposes, they do have some essential similarities. First, all systems have the same high-level architecture; two or more software variants execute simultaneously on the same physical machine, while a monitoring component (on that same machine) compares the variants' overall behavior, provides them with identical inputs, and demultiplexes their outputs. Most monitors perform these tasks by forcing the variants to execute in lock-step at the granularity of system calls. This means that the variants will be suspended at every system call entry and exit, and they will not be allowed to proceed until the monitor has cross-checked (i.e., compared across variants) the system call numbers and arguments. Second, all existing NVX systems cross-check behavior and replicate I/O by intercepting the variants' system calls. Most early systems used a dedicated monitoring process that attaches to the variants and intercepts their system calls using the ptrace API [6, 32, 46, 53, 68] . To avoid the high run-time performance overhead incurred by context switching between a variant process and the monitor process, several teams explored alternative designs that use binary rewriting [33] , virtualization features [40] , or kernel modules [14, 45, 67, 69 ] to intercept and cross-check system calls more efficiently, within the variants' processes and address spaces.
System Calls and I/O Replication
Modern operating systems isolate processes from one another by providing them with a distinct virtual address space and limited privileges. Processes must use system calls to interact with other processes, the host system, and its hardware resources. While the exact implementation of this system call interface depends on the instruction set and operating system, it generally works as follows. First, the program loads the system call number and the system call arguments into the appropriate processor registers or into the stack. Then, the program executes the system call instruction defined by the processor's instruction set. Next, the CPU raises the current privilege level and transfers control to the kernel's system call entrypoint. The kernel then reads the system call number and arguments and invokes the appropriate system service. Finally, the kernel executes the system call return instruction to lower the privilege level and to transfer control back to the program.
NVX systems monitor behavior and replicate I/O at the system call interface. This design lets the system monitor all behavior that can potentially affect the integrity of the OS or other processes, as well as all communication between the variants and external entities 1 . The monitoring and replication must be transparent to the program variants and to the enduser. In other words, neither the variants, nor any external observer should be able to notice any differences (apart from timing) between native execution of a single variant and NVX of multiple variants. To provide this guarantee, our system designates one variant as the leader, while the others become followers. Whenever the variants attempt an I/O operation, our system ensures that only the leader variant actually completes the operation, while the followers skip the operation and wait until they receive the I/O results from the monitor.
ISA-Heterogeneity
An underlying assumption of NVX is that the program variants will behave identically if i) they are built from the same source code, and ii) they receive equivalent benign inputs. This assumption no longer holds in our setting, where we run variants on processors with different ISAs. Differences in the endianness, register, and pointer width -and even the available system calls could lead to observable (yet benign) differences in the variants' behavior, which would all cause false alarms in a traditional NVX system. We encountered many such differences and designed DMON so it can tolerate any expected divergences that stem from the heterogeneous-ISA setting.
ABI-Heterogeneity
Aside from obvious differences such as different instruction opcodes and encoding, endianness, and register/pointer width, ISA-heterogeneous variants often also differ in more subtle ways because the OS maintainers impose a set of conventions for all binary programs compiled for the target ISA. The Application Binary Interface (ABI) documents rules such as sizes of primitive data types, how structs are packed, padded, and aligned, how function callers can pass arguments to their callees, etc. Many of these conventions also affect the program behavior as observed from the system call interface, and we therefore had to carefully design DMON so it takes the ABIs into account when comparing variant behavior.
Threat Model
Throughout the rest of the paper, we will make the following assumptions about the host system and the attacker. Our assumptions are consistent with related work in this area [67] .
Host defenses We assume that the standard set of migitations are in place on any of the physical machines DMON and the variants run on. Specifically, we assume that Data Execution Prevention (DEP) is used, and that memory pages are therefore never writable and executable at the same time. DEP therefore rules out code-injection attacks. Likewise, we assume that all of the host systems have Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) enabled. ASLR randomizes the base addresses of the main program executable and shared libraries, as well as the heap, stack, and any other mapped memory regions. Note that, even with ASLR in place, the NVX system can still override the base addresses of any region mapped into a variant's address space [45, 65] .
Known and vulnerable target We assume that the protected application is known to the attacker, and that the attacker either has direct access to the variant binaries, or that the attacker can reproduce exact replicas of any of the target binaries for offline analysis. We further assume that the protected application has an arbitrary memory read/write vulnerability that the attacker knows how to trigger.
Remote attacker We assume that the attacker does not have direct access to any of the physical machines DMON (or the variants) run on. The attacker can only communicate with the protected application via a remote communication channel such as a network socket. Because the attacker is remote, we also assume that any run-time secrets embedded into the variants (e.g. randomized base addresses) are not known a priori. Similar to other security-focused NVX systems such as ReMon [67] and MvArmor [40] , DMON executes all security sensitive system calls in lock step. Whenever the variants attempt to execute a sensitive system call, DMON ensures that the variants can neither enter the system call routine, nor exit from it until DMON has ensured that all variants have reached equivalent states. We distinguish between the following components of a running DMON system: These components interact whenever the variants execute system calls, as shown in Figure 2 . Whenever a leader or follower variant attempts to enter or exit from a system call ( 1 ), the corresponding L-MON or F-MON interrupts and suspends the variant, reads the call number of the interrupted system call, and invokes a specialized handler routine within the monitor process ( 2 ), which implements the cross-checking and replication logic for that system call.
DMON Design
The monitors use cross-checking handlers when they interrupt variants upon entering a system call. In F-MON, the cross-checking handler gathers information about the variant's state, sends this information to L-MON ( 3 ), and waits for L-MON to confirm that the follower variant is in a state equivalent to the leader variant ( 4 ). In L-MON, the crosschecking handler waits for incoming state information from F-MON, compares that state information with the leader variant's state, and informs F-MON about the results of the comparison.
The state information consists of system call numbers and arguments, with the latter often consisting of one or more pointers to complex data structures (e.g., I/O vectors). The cross-checking handlers serialize these corresponding data structures and append the serialized data to the state information, thereby allowing L-MON to check the variant states for deep equivalence (two data structures are deeply equivalent when the raw data they contain is identical, even though the data or the data structures may be stored at different addresses). If the variant states do not match, DMON will interpret that as a sign of potential compromise, and it will abort execution to protect the host system.
Naive cross-checking of these variant states could trigger false alarms for divergent behavior because the system call interfaces, calling conventions, data representation, etc. may differ across platforms. DMON's cross-checking handler reconciles such differences to avoid alarms for the expected (and benign) divergences (see Section 4.4). For example, the same system call may have different system call numbers in different platforms. To correctly handle this, DMON keeps a mapping between these syscall numbers. The cross-checking handler consults this mapping to recognize equivalent system calls between variants running on different platforms.
If the states do match, the cross-checking handler allows the leader variant to proceed and to enter the kernel-space system call routine. The follower variants can also proceed, but may (optionally) see their system call number replaced by that of the sys_getpid routine in case they attempt to perform an externally observable I/O operation. This mechanism for skipping system calls was also used in prior work [53] .
The monitors use replication handlers when they interrupt variants that return from a system call. Replication handlers for I/O system calls broadcast the system call results from the leader variant to the followers. Replication handlers for other system calls are generally no-ops.
Monitor Design
Prior work often used a central monitor process which simultaneously supervised all of the variants [6, 53, 68] . Subsequent research showed that this centralized model was overly focused on simplicity and security at the expense of performance, and suggested various designs in which each variant was supervised by a dedicated monitor instance [33, 40, 45, 67, 69, 70] . This dedicated monitor instance could be loaded directly into the variants' address spaces, thereby sacrificing the isolation between the variants and the monitor for greatly reduced variant-monitor communication overhead.
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DMON combines elements of both designs. Since we run ISA-heterogeneous variants on different physical machines, we cannot use a single (central) monitor that attaches locally to all variants. Instead, we use a dedicated monitor for each variant and run the monitor on the same machine as the variant it supervises. Our design does, however, enforce strict isolation between the variant and its monitor by running the monitor as a separate process that attaches to the variant using the ptrace API.
Each monitor includes an RC-COM, which exposes our inter-monitor communication API. By separating the lowlevel communication logic from the monitor, we were able to implement and compare various communication mechanisms.
Inter-Monitor Communication
F-MON and L-MON communicate whenever the variants execute a system call. This exchange may include system call numbers, serialized system call arguments, system call results, or instructions on how to proceed from a system call entry point (see Section 4). In many cases, particularly when the system call being executed is deemed security-sensitive, communication must happen synchronously. For instance, L-MON cannot allow the leader variant to proceed past a system call entry point until all instances of F-MON have serialized the state of their corresponding variant, and until they have sent this state to L-MON. F-MON needs to wait even longer as it cannot allow the follower variants to proceed until L-MON has compared the variant states and it has received L-MON's confirmation that the states match.
For good performance, DMON therefore requires a reliable inter-monitor communication channel with minimal latency and high bandwidth. There are many ways to realize such a channel. We experimented with various designs of this communication channel and implemented them in our RC-COM, which exposes the inter-monitor communication API to our monitors.
Network Protocol Choice. The most obvious protocol that meets our reliability demands is TCP, which we used as the basis for our first implementation of RC-COM. However, even with extensive tweaking, our TCP-based implementation had poor throughput and high latency. As an alternative, we therefore used ENet, a lightweight UDP-based protocol that also offers reliable in-order and error-free data transfer [28] . Our performance evaluation confirms that ENet is more efficient than the TCP-based implementation that uses the standard TCP/IP stack.
User-Space Networking. Besides the networking hardware, the operating system also impacts the communication bandwidth and latency. When a network adapter receives a packet, for example, the OS first stores the packet in a kernelspace buffer, before copying it into the receiving application's memory and transferring control to the application. These extra copy operations can be avoided with techniques such as Remote Direct Memory Access (RDMA). RDMA allows two communicating peers to read or write directly from or to the other peer's application memory, thus bypassing the kernel's networking stack. We implemented an RDMA-based version of our RC-COM using Mellanox ConnectX 100 gigabit ethernet interfaces 2 and the Mellanox Messaging Accelerator user-space networking library 3 .
Optimizations
To improve DMON's performance even further, we implemented several optimizations that can reduce the number of the data packets exchanged by our monitors.
Permissive Filesystem Access. Traditional NVX systems enforce replication for all I/O operations, regardless of the type of I/O resource being accessed. The system allows one variant to effectively perform the operation and it then replicates the results to the other variants. Even though this replication mechanism seamlessly provides identical inputs to all variants, it is not always necessary in DMON's case. Specifically, there is no need to replicate read accesses to files that were identical on all physical machines when DMON started, as long as the files have not been modified while DMON was running. We refer to such files as static files and designed DMON such that it can identify them. We also designed the cross-checking handlers for read-only operations such as sys_read, sys_readv, sys_pread, and sys_fstat so that all variants may (optionally) read static files directly from their local file system, thus bypassing the I/O replication mechanism.
To support this optimization, DMON requires that the application's root directory has the same path name on all machines. DMON further assumes that the all files except executables and shared libraries in the application's root-and subdirectories are identical when the system starts.
Asynchronous Cross-Checking. Our basic approach described in Section 4 adds considerable overhead to every system call invocation as every cross-check happens synchronously and requires at least two network round-trips; one for F-MONs to send the system call states of their supervised variants to L-MON, and one for L-MON to instruct F-MONs on how to proceed (abort or continue execution of the variant).
We developed a technique which we call asynchronous cross-checking to reduce this overhead. Inspired by previous work [40, 67] , the idea is to classify system calls into three categories -highly sensitive, moderately sensitive, and non-sensitive -based on the system call number and/or arguments. With asynchronous cross-checking, highly sensitive system calls still execute in lock-step, as before. When F-MON deems a system call moderately sensitive, however, it still sends the system call state information to L-MON, but then immediately resumes execution of the supervised variant without waiting for a reply from L-MON. L-MON eventually receives the state information and may detect a divergence. In that case, L-MON will instruct F-MONs to abort execution through a separate error channel that is used only for this specific purpose. Non-sensitive system calls can execute without any cross-checking at all.
Note that this policy differs from the selective crosschecking described in previous work as DMON detects all divergences for sensitive system calls including moderately sensitive ones, whereas ReMon and MvArmor only detect divergences on invocations of highly sensitive system calls [40, 67] . There may, however, be a delay in the detection of divergent invocations of moderately sensitive system calls.
Immutable State Caching. Many system calls, including sys_getpid and sys_getppid, read immutable state such as the process ID or thread ID. To avoid unnecessary crosschecking and replication, DMON caches the results of the first invocation of these system calls. DMON immediately cancels any subsequent invocations of these calls and returns the cached result instead. Note that, contrary to our other optimizations, immutable state caching can not be disabled.
Reconciling Expected Divergences
In previous NVX systems, all program variants were compiled for the same target architecture and executed on a single machine. DMON, by contrast, allows settings where variants target different ISAs/ABIs, and run on different physical machines. The target ISA and ABI both affect a program's behavior as observed from the system call interface. ISA/ABIheterogeneity therefore challenges the core assumption that variants will behave identically when provided with identical inputs, as long as the inputs do not trigger a program bug nor is the program being attacked.
We studied the ABI specification documents and analyzed actual system call traces of both trivial and complex applications running on ARMv7, ARMv8, i386, and x86-64 CPUs to understand and anticipate benign behavioral divergences arising from ISA/ABI-heterogeneity. We incorporated our findings into DMON's design and summarize the different classes of expected divergences and their causes in Table 1 .
The first and foremost difference between the different ABIs is that the system call numbers can (and often do) differ between ABIs. The sys_read system call, for example, has system call number 0 on x86-64 platforms and on ARMv7 platforms that implement the old ARMv7 ABI (i.e., arm-linux-gnu), 3 on i386 platforms, and 0x900003
Divergences source
Affected system calls Action needed
SYSTEM CALL NUMBER
System call numbers differ between ABIs and/or identical code is translated to slightly different system calls.
SYSTEM CALL ARGUMENTS
Same code is translated to different system calls with similar functionality and diverse arguments.
STRUCT LAYOUT
Struct layout diversity caused from different ABIs. on ARMv7 platforms that implement the new ARMv7 ABI (i.e., arm-linux-gnueabi). DMON is aware of these differences and maps system call numbers to an internal platformindependent identifier before comparing system call states. System call arguments are not necessarily bit-for-bit identical across ABIs either, even when the arguments are in fact the same. This is particularly true for C structs which may be packed differently (i.e., there may be different numbers of padding bytes between the struct fields) or have different sizes depending on the ISA and ABI. To allow for bit-by-bit comparisons of such structs, DMON converts them to an internal "shadow" type that is carefully specified and/or annotated so it has the same layout on all platforms.
FLAGS AND MODES
Except for trivial differences in system call numbers and arguments, heterogeneous-ISA variants may use different system calls altogether, because not all system calls are available on all platforms. ARMv8 kernels, for example, do not implement the sys_open system call. ARMv8 variants therefore always use sys_openat to open a file. sys_openat is similar to sys_open, but does have an additional argument that can hold the file descriptor of a directory. If the pathname argument of the sys_openat is relative, then it is interpreted relative to the directory specified in the additional argument.
x86-64 kernels, on the other hand, implement both sys_open and sys_openat and x86-64 variants regularly use both APIs. Consequently, we may see divergences in a setup where an ARMv8 and x86-64 variant try to open the same files. DMON deals with these divergence by transforming the system call states for similar system calls into generic platform-independent states, prior to cross-checking. In this concrete example, DMON would fully resolve the paths the variants are trying to access and then build system call states corresponding with the invocation of a sys_openat call, regardless of whether the variant called sys_open or sys_openat.
Finally, there are several system calls that accept flags as their arguments. These flags can specify file access modes, file statuses, etc. The integer values assigned to these flags may differ across ABIs. Consequently, cross-checking these flag values may trigger false positive detections. Once again, DMON deals with these divergences by mapping all flag values to an internal platform-independent value prior to crosschecking.
DMON Implementation
We implemented DMON for GNU/Linux. DMON runs natively on the x86-64 and ARMv8 architectures and supports variants compiled for these architectures. DMON also has partial support for ARMv7 and i386.
System Call Support and Classification. DMON currently has cross-checking and replication support for 93 system calls. Table 2 shows an overview of these calls, and how DMON cross-checks and replicates them. The type of crosschecking depends on the security-sensitivity of the call (see Section 4.3). DMON always cross-checks highly sensitive system calls in lock-step. Moderately sensitive calls are either checked asynchronously, if the asynchronous cross-checking optimization is enabled, or in lock-step if the optimization is disabled. None-sensitive calls are not checked at all.
The type of replication depends on the kind of results the system call returns. DMON enforces replication for all I/O operations that are not reads from static files (see Section 4.3), and for all system calls that return mutable program state. Read operations from static files execute without replication if the permissive filesystem access optimization is enabled. System calls that must be executed by all variants and system calls that read cached immutable program state are not subject to any replication. Support Infrastructure. Aside from the core components described in the previous section, DMON comes with two support components. NVX-DAEMON is a standalone service that needs to be installed as a Unix daemon. NVX-DAEMON acts on service requests from our second component, the APP-STARTER. Depending on the type of service request, NVX-DAEMON either launches a new monitor and one or more variants, or shuts down a running monitor and its variants. The APP-STARTER component reads a configuration file written by the system administrator and then sends the appropriate service requests to the NVX-DAEMON components. The configuration file contains information on which variants to start or shut down (e.g., their architectures, path Virtual System Calls. On most architectures, Linux loads a Virtual Dynamic Shared Object (VDSO) or vsyscall page into the address spaces of all user-space programs. These executable code pages expose a number of so-called virtual system calls, which allow the program to execute certain system calls (e.g., sys_gettimeofday) without mode switching into kernel space. Most NVX systems either hide, replace, or disable the VDSO and vsyscall page because virtual system calls are invisible to the monitor, and therefore bypass the replication mechanism. For our prototype, we patched the C library our variants link against so that the library never uses virtual system calls. Operations such as gettimeofday are therefore always visible to our monitors.
Limitations
Asynchronous Signals. Asynchronous signals are currently not supported in our implementation. Our monitors discard any asynchronous signals that the variants might receive. This not a fundamental limitation of our approach but a matter of additional engineering effort. Signal handling mechanisms would be implemented as has already been described in earlier work [33, 53] .
Multithreading. DMON has only partial support for multithreaded variants. Running multithreaded variants currently may trigger divergences and false positive detections. Earlier work describes techniques to support variants in which the threads do not communicate directly [33, 40, 45, 69] . These techniques can directly be incorporated into our prototype. Supporting variants in which the threads do communicate directly is more difficult. The current state-of-the-art is to capture the order in which the leader variant executes thread synchronization instructions, and to replay this order in the follower variants [66] . Incorporating this mechanism into our prototype would require substantial engineering effort.
Address-Dependent Behavior. Similarly, there might be divergences in programs featuring address-dependent behavior. If a program inserts objects into a binary tree based on their memory addresses, and subsequently prints out that tree, the output would likely differ across variants. Earlier work describes several similar cases [68] . We are not aware of any automated solutions for identifying and neutralizing such address-dependent computations, so this is currently an open problem that applies to all NVX systems.
Security Analysis
Scope. NVX systems can prevent the attacker from using absolute code addresses in an exploit payload by adopting a technique called Address Space Partitioning (ASP) [14, 45, 65] . With ASP, the NVX system lays out the variants' address spaces in such a way that (i) the base addresses of executable code regions are randomly chosen, and (ii) no absolute memory address ever points to valid code in more than one variant. We refer the reader to earlier work for a detailed security analysis of this technique [14, 45, 65] , and focus on evaluating the additional security DMON can provide through ISA/ABI-heterogeneity. Specifically, we show the extent to which ISA/ABI-heterogeneity prevents concrete code-reuse and data-only attacks that cannot be easily stopped using existing NVX systems.
Analysis Targets and Configurations. We used four popular server applications -Nginx 1.14.2, Lighttpd 1.4.52, Redis 5.0.1, and ProFTPD 1.3.0 -as our analysis targets, which is in line with previous work on security-oriented NVX systems [40, 45, 67, 69] . We evaluated the security of a heterogeneous configuration with one program variant compiled for Intel x86-64 and one for ARMv7.
Code Layout Diversity
Existing NVX systems that deploy ASP can be bypassed using attacks that rely on partial overwrites of code pointers such as return addresses or function pointers [17, 27] . The basic idea is to force the program to produce a (number of) legal code pointer(s) at memory locations that the attacker can overwrite. The attacker then overwrites the least significant bits or adds arbitrary offsets to each of these code pointers, and thereby diverts the execution of the program to a series of attacker-chosen gadgets (i.e., instruction sequences ending with indirect branches, such as return instructions). In the PIROP attack, for example, Goktas et al. exploited a vulnerability in the Asterisk communication server that allowed them to produce legal return addresses at an attacker-controlled position on the stack [27] . They then overwrote the least significant byte of each of these return addresses to build a so-called PIROP gadget chain, which they then invoked by exploiting another vulnerability. The reason why these attacks bypass existing NVX systems is because they do not require any information leakage (which the NVX system would detect), and because the same partial pointer overwrites can achieve the same results in each variant. In this section, we show that DMON makes these positionindependent code-reuse attacks far more challenging because ISA/ABI-heterogeneity substantially reduces the number of position-independent gadgets available to the attacker.
Position-Independent Gadget Availability. Positionindependent gadgets are instruction sequences that can be reliably invoked by patching legal code pointers. We consider two ways to patch legal code pointers. First, an attacker could overwrite an offset variable that is later added to a code pointer in a pointer arithmetic operation. This primitive allows attackers to reliably invoke any gadget, as long as the internal layout of the target binary is known.
Second, the attacker could overwrite the least significant bits of a code pointer directly using a memory write vulnerability. This primitive is far less potent than the former, as it allows the attacker to overwrite only the 8 least significant bits (i.e., one byte). Overwriting more than one byte is not possible unless the attacker knows the base address of the target binary because the ASP scheme randomizes all but the 12 least significant bits of each base address.
We compiled a list of the position-independent gadgets in both our x86-64 and ARMv7 binaries as follows. We first collected the addresses of (i) all instructions that immediately follow call instructions, and (ii) all address-taken functions in the program. The former is an approximation of the set of legal return addresses that could exist in the program's address space at any given point during its execution. The latter is the set of other code pointers that could be found in the program's memory. Combined, this list approximates the set of pointers that could potentially be patched by attackers to construct position-independent code-reuse payloads.
We then used Ropper to generate lists of regular ROP gadgets consisting of 15 instructions or less [54] . This, again, is consistent with related work [27] .
Next, we combined the two lists for each binary as follows. For every code pointer in the first list, we calculated the (i) addresses of all gadgets relative to the pointer, and (ii) absolute addresses of gadgets that only differ from the code pointer in their 8 least significant bits. The former is the set of gadgets reachable through offset overwrites, while the latter is the set of gadgets reachable through partial pointer overwrites.
Next we correlated the position-independent gadgets found for the x86-64 binary with those found for ARMv7. For each x86-64 gadget, we checked whether there is an ARMv7 gadget that can be reached using the same offset overwrite/partial pointer overwrite. We then eliminated gadgets whose absolute address or offset from the source code pointer is not 4-byte aligned, since code pointers patched in either way would be unaligned on ARMv7 and would trigger an unaligned instruction exception when the gadget is invoked.
We collected 2553 code pointers from Nginx, 1988 code pointers from Lighttpd, 1732 code pointers from Redis, and 4514 code pointers from ProFTPD. Figure 3 shows how many gadgets can be reached on average from each code pointer by offset overwrite and partial pointer overwrite attacks. In a traditional NVX system where all variants are compiled for Intel x86-64, all of the gadgets identified in the x86-64 binary would survive. In contrast, in all four of our target programs, and for both code pointer patching strategies, less than 3.3% of the gadgets survive in an NVX configuration with a x86-64 variant and an ARMv7 variant.
Position-Independent Gadget Semantics. The final step of an exploit is often to call a security-sensitive function or a system call with attacker-specified arguments (e.g., execve with the /bin/sh string as the first argument to spawn a shell). The ABI-heterogeneity provided by DMON imposes another constraint on chaining gadgets to build such an exploit. Because different architectures have different calling conventions for system calls and subroutines, as shown in Table 3 and Table 4 , the attacker should chain a sequence of gadgets that prepare the same set of arguments, but in a different way for each architecture.
For example, in an ARMv7 variant, the attacker must use r7 to prepare a system call number, whereas in a x86-64 variant the same attacker must use rax. To show the difficulty of constructing a code-reuse attack that performs one or more system calls and/or subroutine calls, we analyzed the semantics of position-independent gadgets surviving under DMON. Specifically, we looked for gadgets that read a value from memory and write that value into the system call number register, or the registers for one of the first three arguments of a system or function call. As shown in Figure 3 , only a small fraction of the position-independent gadgets have suitable semantics for argument preparation (see 3rd to 6th bars in the figure). More interestingly, system call number preparation gadgets are rare compared to other argument preparation gadgets. In a standalone ARMv7 binary of Nginx, Redis, and ProFTPD, we could not find a single partial-pointer-overwrite based position-independent gadget which can load a system call number. Obviously then, we also could not find such gadgets among those that survive across architectures.
Data Layout Diversity
Aside from protecting against code-reuse attacks, DMON also raises the bar for successful data-only attacks. In a data-only attack, the adversary forces the program to disclose sensitive information such as pointer values, corrupt sensitive data such as stored user credentials, or perform arbitrary computations [35, 37] , without deviating from its intended control-flow paths.
Prior work showed that NVX systems may be able to stop certain data-only attacks. First, the system can extend ASP to data regions to prevent the variants from disclosing absolute pointer values to remote attackers [40, 45] . Next, the system can run variants with opposing stack growth directions to thwart attacks that corrupt sensitive stack variables [53] . Finally, the variants can use randomizing heap allocators to probabilistically stop data-only attacks that corrupt heap data [4] .
All of these defenses provide diversity at page-or objectlevel granularity. As such, they cannot prevent intra-object overread or overwrite attacks, in which a pointer to a specific field in a data structure is used to disclose or overwrite a different field within that same structure [23] . DMON, in contrast, naturally provides intra-object diversity. Due to differences in sizes of pointers and primitive data types, as well as differences in struct packing and alignment, data structures rarely have the same sizes and layouts across architectures and ABIs.
Previous NVX systems could achieve intra-object diversity by artificially reorganizing structures at compile time (e.g., by reordering struct fields or inserting padding between the fields). However, only a limited number of structs can be compile-time diversified in practice. Specifically, it is not safe to diversify i) structures used as arguments or return types of external library functions, ii) structures with an initialization list, iii) structs cast to different types, etc. [12, 44] . We examined struct layouts in a set of Nginx binaries to show how much structure layout diversity DMON can naturally achieve, compared to the number of structures that can be compile-time diversified by existing type-based structure lay- Figure 3 : The average number of position-independent code-reuse gadgets available from each code pointer for each pointer patching strategy.
out randomization techniques [12, 44] . We found that existing compile-time techniques could only diversify 50 out of 453 structures, whereas 422 out of 453 structures inherently have different layouts on ARMv7 and x86-64.
ProFTPD SSL Private Key Leak. Hu et al. demonstrated an information disclosure attack on ProFTPD, in which the attacker locates a base pointer to an SSL context data structure, and then uses Data-Oriented Programming (DOP) gadgets to traverse through the context and 6 other data structures, ultimately reaching a private key, which is then leaked to a remote attacker [35] . DMON can prevent this attack because the layouts of the 6 data structures differs across architectures. We examined the relevant data structures in ARMv7 and x86-64 binaries of ProFTPD and found that 4 of the 6 pointer fields that need to be dereferenced in this attack are located at different offsets in the two binaries. A DOP exploit that traverses through the structs therefore cannot simultaneously reach and leak the private key on both platforms without triggering an alarm in DMON.
Performance Evaluation
We conducted an extensive performance evaluation of DMON using handwritten microbenchmarks (Section 8.1), as well as popular high-performance server applications (Section 8.2). We ran our benchmarks under two different configurations:
The low-end configuration had an ARMv8 variant running on a Raspberry Pi 3 Model B board with a quad-core 1.2GHz Broadcom BCM2837 64-bit CPU and 1GB of RAM, running the 64-bit ARM Debian 9 distribution of GNU/Linux, as well as an x86-64 variant running on a desktop machine with a quad-core Intel i5-6500 CPU and 16GB of RAM, running the x86-64 version of Ubuntu 16.04.5 LTS. The machines were connected through a private 100 megabit ethernet connection with approximately 0.5ms latency.
The high-end configuration had an x86-64 variant running on a desktop machine with an octa-core Intel i9-9900K CPU and 32GB of RAM, and an x86-64 variant running on a machine with a quad-core Intel i5-6500 CPU and 16GB of RAM. Both machines ran the x86-64 version of Ubuntu 16.04.5 LTS and were connected using a private 100 gigabit connection between two Mellanox ConnectX ethernet interface cards. These RDMA-capable cards support the Mellanox Messaging Accelerator, a user-space networking library with TCP support and sub-microsecond latency.
In both configurations, we ran the leader variant on the slower machine. This choice minimizes the time the leader variant has to wait in its cross-checking handlers for the follower variant to send the system call state information (see Section 4).
We evaluated two implementations of our RC-COM component (see Section 4.2) for the low-end configuration. The first implementation, which appears as KTCP (short for kernelspace TCP) in the graphs, uses the standard Linux TCP/IP stack. The second implementation uses the ENet protocol. For the high-end configuration, we additionally evaluated an implementation that leverages the Mellanox Messaging Accelerator library. This implementation appears as UTCP (short for user-space TCP) in the graphs. We could not test this UTCP implementation for configuration 1 as we could not find the appropriate hardware for our ARMv8 board.
We also evaluated the impact of our replication and crosschecking optimizations described in Section 4.3. Our Asynchronous Cross-Checking optimization appears as ACC in the graphs, whereas our Permissive Filesystem Access optimization appears as PFA.
Microbenchmarks
To measure the overhead introduced by DMON, we designed microbenchmarks to test different combinations of crosschecking and replication strategies (see Section 5) . The microbenchmarks are small programs that execute the same system call one million times in a loop. We used the following system calls:
1. sys_read(STATIC_FILE_FD, buf, 512) reads 512 bytes from a static file. DMON treats sys_read as a moderately sensitive system call. As such, this microbenchmark benefits from our asynchronous crosschecking optimization (see Section 4.3). Since the file we are reading is static, DMON also skips replication if the permissive file system access optimization is enabled.
2. sys_getcwd(buf, 512) retrieves the pathname for the current working directory The results of this system call do not need to be replicated, as long as the current working directory is either the application's root directory, or one of its subdirectories (see Section 4.3).
3. sys_sched_yield() relinquishes the CPU and moves the calling process to the end of the scheduling queue. DMON does not perform cross-checking or replication for this system call.
To understand the performance impact of cross-process monitoring in a distributed setting, we also implemented a rudimentary distributed in-process monitoring mechanism, similar to the one used in VARAN [33] . With this in-process monitoring mechanism, the variants run in the same address space as their monitors and invoke the monitor's crosschecking and replication handlers directly, rather than indirectly through the ptrace API.
For each microbenchmark, we measured the execution time under DMON's high-end configuration relative to the native (standalone) execution time on the slowest machine. Figure 4 shows the mathematical average of the run time for three runs of each benchmark, relative to the native execution time. We used our UTCP implementation of RC-COM for all experiments, but did run separate tests with and without our permissive file access (PFA) and asynchronous cross-checking (ACC) optimizations. We then repeated the experiments with the in-process monitoring mechanism (marked as DIMSM in the graph).
The results show that most of the overhead can be attributed to two sources: the network communication of our replication and cross-checking mechanisms, and the context switching caused by ptrace. PFA reduces the overhead of our read benchmark from 28x to 22x, but does not affect the getcwd and sched_yield benchmarks. This is unsurprising since read is the only of the three system calls that accesses static files. ACC further decreases overhead of read and getcwd, from 22x to 15x and from 38x to 33x respectively. sched_yield's performance is unaffected, since DMON does not perform any cross-checking for this system call.
The rightmost columns in the graph indicate that the context switching overhead of ptrace is by far the biggest contributor to DMON's overhead. Overhead is reduced from 15x to 1.51x for read and from 33x to 1.58x for getcwd. For sched_yield, there is no observable overhead.
Server Benchmarks
We evaluated DMON on 3 popular server applications -Nginx 1.14.2, Lighttpd 1.4.52 and Redis 5.0.1 -that were also used to evaluate prior work [33, 40, 45, 67] . For each of our experiments, we connected a benchmarking client to the machine that runs the leader variant through a 100 megabit ethernet connection (for our low-end configuration) or a 1 gigabit ethernet connection (for the high-end configuration). Figure 5 shows our results.
We used the wrk client to measure the throughput and latency for Nginx and Lighttpd, and the redis-benchmark utility to evaluate Redis. We configured wrk to repeatedly request the same static 4KB web page for 10 seconds using 10 parallel connections, and redis-benchmark to simulate 50 clients issuing 100000 requests in total. Completing 100000 requests takes under a minute when running redis natively on a modern x86 machine. Running the same benchmarks under DMON's slowest configurations would take over a day, however, so we decided to not run the benchmarks at all, and to simply mark the corresponding bars as N/A in the graphs.
We simulated two scenarios for each of our configurations. In Scenarios 1 and 3, we used the network link between the benchmark client machine and the machine that runs the leader variant as-is. This meant that the latency on the 100 megabit link was just under 0.5ms, whereas the latency on the 1 gigabit link was under 0.1ms. The benchmarking client was able to fully saturate the leader variant's machine in both cases. With all of DMON's optimizations enabled, the performance overheads ranged between 7.03x and 21.71x for the low-end configuration, and between 4.52x and 6.65x for the high-end configuration.
In Scenarios 2 and 4, we used the Linux Traffic Control tool (tc) and the netem driver to artificially increase the latency on the benchmarking client's connection to 2ms, thereby simulating the experimental setups used in prior work [14, 46, 67] . In these scenarios, our benchmarking client could not fully saturate the leader variant's machine. With all of DMON's optimizations enabled, the performance overheads ranged between 7.23x and 10.13x for the low-end configuration, and between 1.0x and 1.51x for the high-end configuration. We observed two general trends in our results. First, our RC-COM implementation that uses the standard Linux TCP/IP stack (shown as KTCP in the graphs) is substantially slower than both of the alternative implementations. Second, the web server applications benefit greatly from our permissive filesystem access (PFA) and asynchronous cross-checking (ACC) optimizations. In scenario 3, for example, PFA decreased the overhead of Lighttpd from 23692.60x to 6131.33x with the KTCP-based RC-COM, whereas ACC decreased the overhead from 23692.60x to 8317.97x. For Redis, the effect of enabling these optimizations is negligible. This makes sense, because Redis is an in-memory data structure store that rarely accesses the filesystem.
Comparison With Other NVX Systems
Our server benchmarks show that DMON can incur substantial performance overheads on saturated machines, even when using the User-Space TCP-based implementation of our RC-COM component and both of our cross-checking and replication optimizations. Intuitively, one might think that the inter-monitor communication overhead is to blame. That is not the case, however, as prior work showed nearly identical overheads for a traditional single-host NVX system. Specifically, GHUMVEE was tested on the same server applications (albeit slightly older versions), and in highly similar circumstances, with a 1 gigabit link that had less than 0.1ms of latency. GHUMVEE's overhead on Lighttpd was 7.0x on a saturated server (vs 5.43x for DMON), and 12.48x for Redis (vs 6.65x for DMON) [67] . Handing the monitoring of non-sensitive system calls over from the ptrace-based GHUMVEE to the in-process monitor IP-MON brought down the overhead to 2.69x and 1.45x for Lighttpd and Redis resp. DMON could likely achieve even better performance if we added full in-process monitoring, because DMON supports asynchronous cross-checking of moderately sensitive system calls and permissive filesystem access for static content.
Discussion
Asymmetrical Attacks. The heterogeneity present in the code and data layout can still, in theory, be bypassed by attackers. For example, an attacker can perform a set of malicious operations, which is functional in one variant, but interpreted as no-operation in the other. By combining two sets of such operations in an attack (each set only functional for each variant), the attacker can perform the same malicious operation in all variants, evading DMON's detection.
For example, in a PIROP attack, the attacker can find gadgets that are only functional in one variant, and interpreted as no-operation in the other, and chain them together. An attacker can also adopt a similar strategy to construct certain data-only attacks. In a privilege escalation attack, for example, the attacker can tolerate the difference in the layout of a structure by overwriting a security sensitive field at both offsets in all variants, even when each offset is valid only for a single variant. This results in an unintended corruption of variables in all variants. As long as such corruption does not trigger an observable divergence, however, the attacker can bypass DMON.
Leveraging Hardware Features. A potential advantage of running variants on different architectures is that the NVX system could leverage hardware security features available on one platform to protect software running on other platforms. A future revision of the ARMv8 architecture (ARMv8.5-A), for example, will include a feature called Memory Tagging. This feature allows the program to add tags to every pointer and every memory allocation. When the program dereferences a pointer, the CPU automatically checks if the pointer tag matches the allocation tag. Memory tagging, if properly implemented, can detect both spatial and temporal memory errors. A hypothetical configuration in which DMON runs one variant on an ARMv8.5-A CPU and one variant on an Intel x86-64 CPU could be used to bring the benefits of memory tagging to Intel x86-64 software. In a similar manner, DMON could enable Intel's Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET) for ARM programs, and ARMv8.3's pointer authentication for Intel x86-64 programs.
Micro-Architectural Attacks. While our primary focus was on defending against memory exploits, we believe DMON might also be able to stop certain micro-architectural attacks. Rowhammer attacks in particular would become exceedingly hard to launch against DMON [31, 55, 63] . Rowhammer attacks induce bit flips in so-called weak DRAM cells by rapidly and repeatedly accessing adjacent DRAM rows. To build reliable Rowhammer attacks, the attacker needs to know exactly how the memory controller translates physical memory addresses into DRAM addresses [50, 61] . Translation schemes differ greatly across platforms, however, which makes Rowhammer attack payloads non-portable. Moreover, even if two machines did have memory controllers using the same translation scheme, Rowhammer attacks would still fail with high probability under DMON, as the positions of the weak cells tend to differ for any given pair of DRAM modules.
10 Related Work N-Variant eXecution. The idea of running diversified software variants in parallel for increased security is not new. Inspired by Chen and Avizienis' seminal work on N-Version Programming [2, 10] , Berger and Zorn proposed a system for probabilistic memory safety that could run simultaneously execute identical variants with differently seeded randomizing memory allocators [4] . This system only supported applications that received input through stdin and that wrote output to stdout, however. Cox et al.'s N-Variant Systems monitored a much wider array of system calls and replicated I/O from various sources, thus supporting variants of non-trivial applications such as the Apache web server [14] . Subsequent publications explored consistent delivery of asynchronous signals [6, 53] , dealing with shared memory [6] , thread synchronization [66] , or address-dependent behavior [68] , and new schemes for generating software variants [40, 45, 65, 69] . Other researchers suggested to use NVX systems for live patch testing [32, 33, 39, 41, 46, 51] . Contrary to DMON, however, all of these systems require that the variants are compiled for the same architecture, and run on the same host.
Pina et al. proposed a Domain-Specific Language to specify expected divergences between different variants, and an NVX system that reconciles divergent variants [52] . Here, the assumption is that the variants have minor differences because they were not compiled from the same revision of the source code. DMON assumes that the variants were compiled from the same source code, but it does reconcile variants that diverge because of ISA and ABI-heterogeneity.
Heterogeneous-ISA Migration. Several researchers explored the idea of heterogeneous-ISA program migration. Devuyst et al. demonstrated performance and energy efficiency increases by migrating the execution of a program between the cores of a heterogeneous-ISA CPU [16] . Venkat et al. later showed that heterogeneous-ISA migration has potential security benefits [64] . These systems require specialized CPUs that are not widely available, whereas DMON was designed to run on commodity hardware.
Conclusion
We presented DMON, a novel, distributed N-Variant Execution system that leverages diversity in instruction set architectures and application binary interfaces to protect against memory corruption attacks. To bypass DMON, attackers must provide exploits that simultaneously work on two or more different platforms. We analyzed binaries for two completely different platforms, one for x86-64 and one for ARMv7 (32-bit) . Our analysis shows that DMON can be an effective mitigation for position-independent code-reuse attacks which bypass traditional NVX systems. For security-critical server applications, only 1-3% of position-independent code-reuse gadgets survived on both platforms. Furthermore, our case study shows that DMON can raise the bar for successful dataonly attacks when the variants have different data-layouts due to differences in their data type sizes, struct packing and alignment rules, etc.
Unlike previous NVX systems which run on a single machine, network communications between the monitors on different machines become a new source of performance overhead for DMON. We introduce new optimizations to minimize network round-trips: permissive filesystem access, asynchronous cross-checking, and immutable state caching. Our performance evaluation shows that these optimizations, combined with an optimized network protocol, greatly reduces the performance overhead (from thousands times to single digit percentages in realistic scenarios) without sacrificing DMON's security guarantees.
